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The Relationship between Medical Law and Medical Ethics 
Emily Jackson 
 
 
The relationship between medical law and medical ethics is complicated. There are 
times when what a doctor (or other healthcare professional) should do in order to act 
lawfully is much the same as what she should do in order to behave ethically. Ethics’ 
guidance to doctors stresses the need to ensure that the patient has given informed 
consent, for example, and doctors are also under a legal duty to ensure that the 
patient is adequately informed before she gives consent. At other times, medical 
ethics is more demanding than law, requiring more of a ‘good’ doctor than simply 
refraining from harming the patient. Perhaps counter-intuitively, there are also 
instances when the law appears to ask more of doctors than medical ethics.  
Doctors may have difficult questions to resolve when their legal duties appear to 
conflict with their perception of their ethical responsibilities. The law might seem to 
require a doctor to behave in a way which conflicts with his or her personal morality 
or beliefs. It is also possible that parliament could pass a statute with which the 
doctor must comply but where compliance appears to conflict with her primary 
responsibility to make the care of her patient her first concern.  
In short there are a series of tensions and discrepancies between what is ‘legal’ and 
what is ‘ethical’ in the context of medical treatment, which may be confusing for 
healthcare professionals and patients alike. This is exacerbated by the tendency to 
lump medical law and medical ethics together: there are courses, textbooks, research 
centres and aspects of medical training called ‘medical ethics and law’ or ‘medical 
law and ethics’. Of course, there is considerable overlap in the subject matter of a 
medical ethics textbook and a medical law text. But teasing out some of the 
differences between what is demanded by medical ethics and what is required by 
law suggests that the relationship between ethics and law is perhaps more slippery 
than is sometimes assumed.  
In this short commentary, I will contrast guidance to doctors on what is ethical with 
the law. In doing so, I will rely on the ethical guidance which is provided to doctors 
by professional bodies,1 rather than starting from first principles. I do so not because 
I wish to make a claim that this sort of guidance has a monopoly on what is ethical. 
Rather the point of this note is to highlight some of the confusing signals that are sent 
to doctors about both the equivalence and the divergence of legal and ethical 
requirements, and this is best illustrated by contrasting the law, as laid down in 
statute or embodied in the common law, and ethics, as set out in these sorts of codes 
of conduct or good practice. 
 
 
 
                                                        
1 See, for example, BMA Key Guidance on Ethics http://bma.org.uk/practical-support-at-
work/ethics/ethics-a-to-z;  GMC Good Medical Practice http://www.gmc-
uk.org/guidance/ethical_guidance.asp. 
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Is medical ethics more demanding of doctors than law? 
There are times when guidance on how to behave ethically demands more of doctors 
than compliance with the law. The imbalance of power in the doctor/patient 
relationship means that doctors must not abuse the trust that is placed in them.  It 
would not be unlawful for a doctor to have a sexual relationship with a consenting, 
adult patient, but it would be unethical. 
Where the same medical encounter is governed both by the common law and by 
professional standards and ethical guidance, the profession not infrequently requires 
more of itself than is required in order to avoid legal challenge. A good example of 
this is the requirement to provide the patient with sufficient information before she 
consents to medical treatment. A patient who is inadequately informed about the 
treatment they are about to receive might have a remedy in tort law if the failure to 
provide them with that information: (a) could be said to be negligent, and, (b) caused 
them physical harm. In determining whether an inadequate disclosure was 
negligent, the courts were historically guided by what the reasonable doctor would 
do. Although tort law has been moving towards a ‘reasonable patient’ test for 
disclosure, where the doctor is under a duty to provide whatever information a 
reasonable person in the patient’s position would normally want to know, this is also 
an objective test which delivers standardised information to all patients, rather than 
tailoring it to the perhaps idiosyncratic preferences of the individual. 
In contrast, GMC guidance explicitly adopts a subjective, patient-specific standard of 
care: 
28. The amount of information about risk that you should share with patients will 
depend on the individual patient and what they want or need to know. . . .  
31. You should do your best to understand the patient’s views and preferences about 
any proposed investigation or treatment, and the adverse outcomes they are most 
concerned about. You must not make assumptions about a patient’s understanding of 
risk or the importance they attach to different outcomes.2 
 
If ethical guidance to doctors could always be relied upon to be more demanding 
and more detailed than a doctor’s legal duties, the relationship between medical law 
and medical ethics might look quite straightforward. Confusingly, however, there 
are times when this weighting is reversed, and the law contains a set of much more 
rigorous and detailed requirements. An example would be the Mental Capacity Act 
2005.  
The GMC’s guidance to doctors on making treatment decisions when a patient lacks 
capacity borrows extensively from the Mental Capacity Act, with its focus both on 
how to maximise the number of patients able to make decisions for themselves, and 
on ensuing that decisions taken on behalf of a person who lacks capacity as far as 
possible reflect their beliefs, values and preferences.3 The GMC Guidance on the 
additional support a patient may need in order to make a decision for themselves is 
contained in one paragraph. 4  In contrast, the Mental Capacity Act, with its 
                                                        
2 Consent: Patients and Doctors Making Decisions Together GMC (2008). 
3 Ibid. 
4 Para 21. 
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accompanying Code of Practice, is much more detailed. The Act contains a principle 
of assisted decision-making: ‘A person is not to be treated as unable to make a 
decision unless all practicable steps to help him to do so have been taken without 
success’,5 which is bolstered by a statutory requirement to give information in a way 
that the patient is likely to be able to understand:  
A person is not to be regarded as unable to understand the information relevant to a 
decision if he is able to understand an explanation of it given to him in a way that is 
appropriate to his circumstances (using simple language, visual aids or any other 
means).6 
The Code of Practice goes even further. It has a whole chapter entitled ‘How should 
people be helped to make their own decisions?’ 7  This goes into extraordinary detail 
about how doctors should help people to be able to make decisions for themselves, 
including, for example, exhortations to: 
•  Speak at the right volume and speed, with appropriate words and sentence 
structure. It may be helpful to pause to check understanding or show that a choice is 
available. 
•  Break down difficult information into smaller points that are easy to 
understand. Allow the person time to consider and understand each point before 
continuing.8 
Although there is not a substantive difference between the law and GMC guidance – 
both stress the need to help patients to make decisions for themselves – in complete 
contrast to the rules on consent, the law here is, in fact, much more specific on what 
doctors actually need to do. 
 
 
When ethics and law conflict with each other 
There are two ways in which a doctor might find herself concerned about a conflict 
between her duty to comply with the law and her ethical responsibilities. The first is 
where her legal obligations appear to conflict with her personal beliefs about the 
ethical acceptability of a particular course of action.  
In some circumstances, healthcare professionals are given a specific right of 
conscientious objection in order that they can excuse themselves from providing 
treatment which they believe to be unethical. These rights have tended to be both 
exceptional and quite narrowly drawn. In relation to abortion, for example, until the 
decision of the Scottish Court of Session (Inner House) in Doogan v Greater Glasgow 
and Clyde Health Board,9 at the time of writing under appeal to the Supreme Court, it 
appeared that the right of conscientious objection was confined to actually 
participating in the termination of a pregnancy. Although it remains to be seen what 
the Supreme Court will decide, in Doogan, midwives who worked as ‘labour ward 
coordinators’ were held to have a right to conscientiously object to duties described 
as ‘delegating, supervising and/or supporting other staff in the participation and 
provision of care to patients undergoing medical termination’.  
                                                        
5 Section 1(1)(3). 
6 Section 3(2). 
7 Mental Capacity Act 2005 Code of Practice, chapter 3. 
8 Para 3.10 
9 [2013] CSIH 36. 
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It is not clear where this leaves a doctor who does not want to have to refer a woman 
for a termination. Before Doogan, it was assumed that the right to conscientiously 
object did not extend to a right to refuse to refer a woman for a termination of 
pregnancy, regardless of the doctor’s personal difficulty in doing so. 
Although not subject to a statutory right of conscientious objection, some doctors 
have concerns about withdrawing life-prolonging treatment. In Re B (Adult: Refusal of 
Treatment),10 Ms B, a competent, adult woman, wished to be withdrawn from the 
ventilator which was keeping her alive. Once the judge, Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss 
P, had determined that Ms B was competent, it followed that her decision to refuse 
treatment had to be respected. Indeed to continue to treat Ms B in the face of a 
competent refusal amounted to an assault. Despite this Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss 
P was sympathetic towards the doctors involved in her care, who ‘could not bring 
themselves to contemplate that they should be part of bringing Ms B’s life to an end by the 
dramatic … step of turning off the ventilator’. Dr C, for example, ‘did not feel able to 
agree with simply switching off Ms B’s ventilation. She would not be able to do it. 
She felt she was being asked to kill Ms B’. 
Regardless of the finding that in continuing to treat Ms B, the doctors were acting 
unlawfully, and indeed were, in legal terms, assaulting her, their reluctance to 
participate in bringing about her death was respected and Ms B was moved to 
another hospital where the ventilator was removed.  
At first sight, it seems extraordinary that a doctor should be permitted to 
conscientiously object to refraining from assaulting his patient. On the other hand, it 
could be argued that the real oddity here is the law’s pragmatic classification of the 
deliberate withdrawal of life support as an ‘omission’. Although most of us would 
regard physically withdrawing a patient from a ventilator as an ‘action’, the law 
treats it as an omission in order to avoid its otherwise inevitable categorisation as 
murder. Dame Elizabeth Butler-Sloss P was simply acknowledging that bringing 
about a patient’s death can be difficult, regardless of the fact that it is achieved by 
what the law treats as ‘a failure to act’.  
In any event, it is clear that if alternative arrangements could not have been made for 
Ms B, the doctors’ reluctance to participate in Ms B’s death could not have been 
respected and they would have had to comply with her wishes, regardless of any 
discomfort and distress that this would have caused them. The doctor’s overarching 
duty is to make the care of the patient her first concern. If a patient is seeking a 
treatment which is lawful, but with which the doctor disagrees on moral grounds, 
the doctor’s primary duty continues to be to the patient. The doctor must not 
abandon her patients whenever she disapproves of their choices and must ensure 
their continuity of care. If it is possible for the doctor to hand the care of a patient 
over to another doctor, it may be acceptable for the doctor to withdraw from that 
person’s care.11 If this is not possible, the doctor must be able to find it within herself 
                                                        
10 [2002] EWHC 429 (Fam). 
11 BMA, Withholding and Withdrawing Life-prolonging Medical Treatment, 3rd ed. (BMA, 2007). 
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to carry on caring for the patient. A doctor who is unable always to make the care of 
her patients her first concern simply cannot fulfil the most basic duty of a doctor.12 
More difficult still is the second way in which a doctor’s ethical responsibility might 
conflict with her legal duties, namely when a doctor believes that the law is requiring 
her to do something that is at odds with her overriding ethical duty to make the care 
of her patient her first concern. This is most likely to happen when legislation 
attempts to restrict a doctor’s discretion to act in his patient’s best interests. 
Whenever doctors are placed under mandatory reporting duties, for example, their 
freedom to judge that, in a particular case, reporting would do more harm than good 
is removed. If doctors are instructed that they must not treat someone who is not 
ordinarily resident in the UK unless that person has the resources to pay for 
treatment, once again, the doctor’s freedom to do what she thinks is best for that 
patient is restricted. 
Mandatory reporting is popular with tabloid journalists who want to appear to be 
taking a tough and uncompromising approach to illegal and/or abusive behaviour. 
If we are concerned about the widespread failure to prosecute those who are 
engaged in female genital mutilation, slavery, human trafficking or the sexual abuse 
of children, for example, then it is easy to see why some might argue that doctors 
and other relevant professionals should be under a duty to report their suspicions to 
the police. 
The problem with mandatory reporting is not that it seeks to encourage reporting or 
make it routine, but rather that it removes the possibility that, in a rare case, a 
healthcare professional may judge that disclosure to the police, or another body, may 
place the victim in immediate and grave danger. In addition, if such victims know 
that reporting is mandatory, perhaps because they have previously experienced its 
consequences, they may be less likely to come forward to seek medical attention, 
regardless of the seriousness of their injuries. In two ways, then, mandatory 
reporting could jeopardise the health or even the life of the victim of serious crime. 
On the reporting of crime and abuse, professional ethical guidance starts from the 
presumption that prompt reporting is essential in order to protect the victim. There 
is no doubt from reading the GMC’s guidance on Protecting Children and Young People 
that doctors are under a duty to report suspicions of abuse or neglect to an 
appropriate agency.13 However, the guidance also acknowledges that there may be 
rare cases where immediate reporting would conflict with the duty to make the care 
of the patient one’s first concern.14 In contrast, mandatory reporting duties would 
seek to remove the doctor’s judgement from the equation.  
The current government’s stance on mandatory reporting is confusing. It appeared to 
recognise its disadvantages in its response to the Home Affairs Select Committee’s 
report on child sexual exploitation: 
The international evidence on the effectiveness of mandatory reporting systems 
keeping children safer is far from conclusive. Much of the evidence suggests that 
mandatory reporting systems cause a steep rise in the number of reports made, a 
                                                        
12 GMC, Good Medical Practice (GMC, 2013). 
13 GMC, Protecting Children and Young People: The responsibilities of all doctors (GMC, 2012). 
14 Para 39. 
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large percentage of which are not substantiated. Consequently, child protection 
services are likely to be overloaded with work in investigating unsubstantiated 
reports, with an adverse impact on the resources available to help children and 
families in need. A mandatory reporting system could also potentially act as a barrier 
to children disclosing issues or seeking help, especially perhaps in a sexual health 
context.15 
A year later, the prime minister appeared to be more enthusiastic about mandatory 
reporting in the case of FGM. According to his twitter account, David Cameron 
stated: ‘I'll make reporting FGM mandatory for doctors, teachers and social workers. 
Let's end this abhorrent practice once and for all.’ 
And despite its recognition of the risks of mandatory reporting, section 44(1) of the 
government’s Modern Slavery Act 2014 contains a mandatory reporting duty: ‘A 
specified public authority must notify the National Crime Agency [NCA] if it has 
reason to believe that a person may be a victim of slavery or human trafficking.’  
Section 44 (3) does specify that an adult victim’s name should not be disclosed 
without their consent, but contains no such provision for trafficked children. Of 
course, reporting to the NCA should be routine in such cases, but if the doctor judges 
that immediate reporting might put a child victim in grave danger, he or she has no 
discretion to delay reporting. 
A different set of circumstances when the law might appear to demand that a doctor 
acts contrary to her first responsibility to her patient is when doctors are required to 
participate in efforts to restrict access to NHS services to those who are entitled to 
them. To be eligible for free NHS care, a person has to be ‘ordinarily resident’ in the 
UK, thus excluding illegal immigrants and failed asylum seekers. Clinicians are 
entitled to treat people regardless of their immigration status if treatment is urgently 
required. But if treatment could wait until the person leaves the UK, treatment 
should not be provided, regardless of how beneficial it would be for the patient. 
Clinicians should also inform their trusts’ Overseas Visitors Manager if they become 
aware that a patient is not ordinary resident in the UK, thus potentially jeopardising 
their ability to treat that patient in her best interests. Of course, it could be argued 
that doctors have a role to play in ensuring the sustainability of the NHS, which 
could not afford to provide limitless treatment to patients from across the world. 
Nevertheless, some doctors may find it difficult to assume the role of the enforcer of 
immigration rules, rather than always simply acting in the best interests of the 
patient in front of them. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
Although there may be tensions and discrepancies, as well as similarities between a 
doctor’s legal duties and her ethical responsibilities, her duty is to comply with both 
the law and with professional ethical guidance. Even where a doctor finds 
                                                        
15 Government response to the Second Report of the Home Affairs Committee, Session 2013-14, Child 
sexual exploitation and the response to localised grooming, HC 68. 
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compliance with the law difficult, perhaps because it appears to her to be at odds 
with her ethical beliefs, compliance is not optional. It could be argued that doctors 
indirectly also have a legal duty to comply with GMC good practice guidance, 
because a doctor’s registration can be put at risk by a failure to do so.  
One of the principal difficulties for doctors lies in working out what their legal 
responsibilities are, since, unlike GMC guidance, they are not set out in a set of easily 
searchable documents on an accessible website. Where ethical guidance demands 
more of doctors than the law, as is the case with the duty to provide sufficient 
information to the patient before she gives consent, the inaccessibility of legal 
sources may not matter very much. If the doctor complies with GMC guidance on 
information provision, she will undoubtedly also have acted non-negligently. Where, 
in contrast, the law sets out more rigorous and demanding requirements than ethical 
guidance, it is not always clear that this will be obvious or the details easily 
accessible to the medical profession. 
Post-legislative scrutiny of the Mental Capacity Act 2005 provides a vivid illustration 
of the fact that passing legislation is not necessarily sufficient to change behaviour. 
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 is widely acknowledged to be a strikingly patient-
focussed statute, which the post-legislative scrutiny Select Committee found was 
described in ‘unusually enthusiastic language’ by stakeholders. It was not well 
understood, however, and had not been properly implemented: 
The empowering ethos of the Act has not been widely implemented. Our evidence 
suggests that capacity is not always assumed when it should be. Capacity 
assessments are not often carried out; when they are, the quality is often poor. 
Supported decision-making, and the adjustments required to enable it, are not well 
embedded. The concept of unwise decision-making faces institutional obstruction due 
to prevailing cultures of risk-aversion and paternalism. Best interests decision-making 
is often not undertaken in the way set out in the Act: the wishes, thoughts and 
feelings of P are not routinely prioritised.16  
In addition to a general lack of awareness of the Act’s provisions, crucially no body 
had been given ownership of it and responsibility for its implementation. As a result, 
clinical practice had remained largely unaffected by what could be described as a 
dramatic sea change in the law. GMC guidance has ‘bite’ because a failure to follow 
it could put a doctor’s registration at risk. Not doing everything possible to assist a 
vulnerable patient to make a decision for herself is a failure to follow the Mental 
Capacity Act, but without proper oversight, such failures may have been inadvertent 
and have gone largely unnoticed. In short, while doctors have a duty to act lawfully, 
as well as ethically, without making the law more accessible and putting in robust 
mechanisms for accountability, important legislative change may not make the 
difference that it should. 
 
                                                        
16 Select Committee on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, Mental Capacity Act 2005: post-legislative scrutiny 
(2014), para 104. 
